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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE S'l'A'l'E OF U'l'All
D. CLARK WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MERRILL L. OLDROYD, GERALD CARTER,
and JOHN A. CANTO,

Case No. 15313

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for trespass and to quiet title
to certain real property located in Utah County, Utah.

The

defendants denied any trespass or damage, and counterclaimed
to quiet title to said property in defendant Gerald Carter,
and to reform various deeds, on the basis of erroneous deed
descriptions and prolonged acquiescence in established natural
and man-made boundary lines.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen,
District Judge.

By stipulation in open court, the action was

dismissed against defendant Merrill L. Oldroyd.

On February 14,

1977, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made, and
judgment was entered against defendants.

Defendants then

a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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filed· . .

or.

J

..

in the Alternative, for a New Trial.
June 13, 1977.

This motion was denied~

Defendants Gerald Carter and John A.

Canton~

appeal from the entry of judgment and denial of the motion.
RELIEF SOUGH'l' ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully ask the Court:

1.

To reverse the judgment of the trial court and to enter a
judgment quieting title to the disputed property in appellar.

1

Gerald Carter.
2.

To find that a boundary by acquiescence has been establishec:
consisting of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad right-of-w,:
on the north, an existing fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork

I

Creek on the east, U.S. Highway 6 on the south, and the west!
boundary of a pond on the west.

3.

I

To reform and correct the basic deed and subsequent convey·
!

ances in the chain of title to conform with the true in ten··
tion of the parties at the times of their execution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I

The evidence developed in the case shows that on or at)
May 22, 1954, the plaintiff, in concert with Clifton Huff and
Dennis L. Prince, formed a partnership under the name and style
of Skyline Enterprises, and on the same date the plaintiff and
his then wife, Evelyn J. Williams, conveyed by warranty deed tc
D. Clark Williams, Clifton Huff, and Dennis L. Prince, a
partnership doing business as Skyline Enterprises, a metes and
bounds description of a tract of land purporting to comprise
10. 74 acres in Section 14, Township 10 South, Range 6 East,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1

Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(Exhibits "27" and "12tt)

The

partnership constructed and operated a motel, service station,
and restaurant facility on the property described in said deed,
with camping facilities and areas for deer hunters, sportsmen,
and travelers extending in and upon the land which is disputed
in this action.

('l'r., pp. 109, 293)

The deeded description set out in the conveyance of
May 22, 1954, is itself erroneous, and, if literally followed,
would embrace a large portion of U.S. Highway 6 on the south,
and thereby change the northern border consistent therewith.
(Tr., pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 66, 69, 85)
A map of the land in question prepared from a survey
by Surveying Associates, Inc., was introduced by defendants and
received in evidence as Exhibit "21", which purports to show,
within the yellow lines, the possession survey of land claimed
by the defendants and, by the blue lines, the deeded tract a$
adjusted to eliminate the conflict with U.S. Highway 6.

That

portion of the land bounded in yellow lines and located generally north and east of the blue lines on the plat constitutes
the disputed area.

The northern part of the yellow line follows

an existing fence line and the south side of the Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way, and the eastern ehd of the
yellow line follows a fence along Tie-Fotk Creek.

The west

end of the northern and western yellow line also follows, genera11y,
the west boundary of a pond.

The southern boundary 1ine marked in

yellow follows the north edge of U.S. Highway 6.
The evidence further shows that subsequent to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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formation of the above-mentioned partnership, two of the
parties thereto, including the plaintiff, and Wallace Gardner,
as a successor in interest of Dennis L. Prince, formed a
corporation under the name and style oi Skyview Enterprises,
Inc., and transferred the property to that corporation by the
same erroneous description by which it was originally conveyed
to the partnership by the plaintiff.

(Exhibit "8")

Sometime prior to January, 1961, the plaintiff
endeavored to interest the defendant, Merrill L. Oldroyd, in
the corporation and urged him to purchase the stock of
Wallace Gardner.

(Tr., pp. 117, 233, 234, 239)

In conver-

sations between the plaintiff and the defendant, Merrill L.
Oldroyd, on that occasion, the plaintiff represented to the
I

defendant, Oldroyd, that the corporation was the owner of a trac~
I

real property bounded on the north by the right-of-way line
of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the east by a fence
adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S. Highway.Ii;
and on the west by a pond, which is the precise description
shown on Exhibit "21" bounded in the yellow lines.
238-239)

(Tr., pp.

In reliance on these representations as to the

property owned by the corporation, the defendant, Oldroyd,
purchased shares in the corporation and the corporation thereafter occupied, claimed, and utilized all of the land embraced
within said boundaries as depicted on Exhibit "21" within the
yellow lines, without any objection, dispute, or question on
the part of the plaintiff.

(Tr., p. 239)

Sometime prior to July 16, 1963, the defendant,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Olrtroyd, and his family, became the owners of all of the stock
of Skyview Enterprises, Inc., including the stock of the
plaintiff.

(Tr., pp. 119-120, 239)
On or about July 16, 1963, Skyview Enterprises, Inc.,

as a corporation, entered into a contract for the sale by that
corporation and the purchase by D. Lloyd Horlacher, and
Elda Horlacher, of the premises and property theretofore owned
and claimed by the corporation.

(Exhibit "42")

In January of

1966, D. Lloyd Horlacher assigned his interest under said

contract to Elda Horlacher.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Horlacher testified that prior to
their purchasing the property from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., they
also had conversations on the land with the plaintiff, Williams,
who was then operating the property for the corporation,
at which time they requested that the plaintiff point out the
physical boundaries of the land owned by the corporation,
whereupon Williams again represented to them, on two separate
occasions, that the property was bounded on the north by the
right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the
east by a fence adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S.
Highway G; and on the west by a pond, the substantial portion
of which description is enclosed by a long-existing fence and
is depicted on Exhibit "21" as that land bordered in yeliow
lines.

('I'r., pp. 207, 215,

261)

In his pleadings, plaintiff admitted making the
aforesaid representations both to the Uorlachers and to Oldroyd.
In his reply to the counterclaim of the defendants, Uhder his
Th1rd Defense, plaintiff admits that "any statement or commuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nication made by him relative to any land cliiimed by the defenrj.
ants within Section 14, 'l'ownship 10 South, Range 6 East, Salt
(Emphasis added.)
his Fourth Defense,

plr;i n tiff

conununication made by him

In

further udrn) ts that "any ::; tcttern€::i

rclativ~'

LO

ar.~1

1,11,d claimed by the

defendants within Section 14, Township 10 South, Range 6 Ectst,
Salt Lake Mr1idian, was made in good faith and was made

wi~

probable cause for believing the truth of any statement or
conununication made."

(Emphasis added.)

The Horlachers, while in possession of the

proper~,

further improved the disputed land by erecU.i;g toilets next
to 'l'ie-Fork Creek on the east, by installing electrical
outlet~

on

the Horth,

the disputed area.

<.ill<l

('l'r.,

by cJ.<•<Jr;inq, '"JT<Hl) 11•1,
pp.

217-218,

219,

anc1 sccrli.r,•J

297-298)

Mrs. Horlacher and her son, Gerald Carter, lived
worked

OH

a~

the property while i t was opera tee"! both as a partner:iJ

and corporation by the plaintiff,

from about the years 19'J4

to 1956, she as a cook, and he as a part-time service statioo
operator.

Both were familic.tr with that property which was occud

used and claimed by both the partnership and the corporatioo,
which included that lancl embraced within the yellow lines and
within the fence lines and railroad and highway rights-of-way
and the pond,

as depicted

011

Exhibit "21".

(Tr., PP·

292-293,

294)
On or about ,J<ll>Uary 11,

]9fi6, Mrs.

July 16, 1963, with Skyview Enterprises,

llor]acher ei:terec•

Inc.,

to her soi·
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I

Gerdld Carter dnd his wife, dS dssignees and buyers.
"36")

(Exhibit

The defendant, Oldroyd, consented to that dgreement

dnd assignment on or about Jdnudry 21, 1966, as the assignee
from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., of the seller's interest
under said contract.

The defenddnt, Gerald Carter, and his

wife then went into possession and have continued to occupy
dnd claim the property since mi or about January 11, 1966.
(Tr., pp. 221, 296-297)
The defendant, John A. Canto, testified that in
July of 1974, he had a conversation with the plaintiff on the
property.

The plaintiff wanted to employ Canto to do some work

on the plaintiff's property.

Canto said that he could not do

it until he had finished a job for Carter.

When the plaintiff

inquired as to how long this would take, Canto described the
work as leveling Carter's land to Tie-Fork Creek on the east
and the railroad right-of-way on the north.

The plaintiff

made no mention to Canto of any claim of ownership to that
land, nor did he object in any way to his doing the work.
fact,

In

later, while the work was in progress, the plaintiff

came by on several occasions while Canto was on the land with
his equipment leveling the disputed area, and the plaintiff
waved to him, but at no time made any objection to his working
on the land.

('rr., pp. 271-274)

Mr. Carter testified that he has consistently occupied,
claim0d, operated, d11d used the premises and property bounded
on th0 north by the rdilroad right-of-way, on the east by a
f-t•nu• c1djacent to Tie-Fork Creek,

on the south by U.S. Highway

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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6, and on the west by a pond, which is the same property
depicted within tho yellow li110s

011

l·:xhibit "21".

Ile further

testified that at no time did he occupy or operate the µropen,.
under a lease or any other tenancy arrangement with the
defendant, Oldroyd, but only as a contract purchaser.

(Tr., pp.

298-299, 305-306)
Mr. Carter confirmed the fact that while he was on
the property with his mother, Mrs. Horlacher,

from about

1954 to about 1956, he observed the use being made of the
property by the partnership and corporation, which included
the land within the disputed area.

(Tr., pp.

293, 294)

He

testified that from the time he took over the property, he
also rented camper spaces throughout the entire disputed area,
and had as many us thirty-five

(3'i)

campers n11d trailers in the

disputed area, at given times, not counting tents or
trailers and other vehicles.
this area,

hors~

All of the car·1pers and users of

including Dennis L. Prince, who wcis one of the orig'·

partners with the plain ti ff when the land was acquired, imprO'!f.
and operated in 19 5 4, did so with Carter's permission, and the
permission of his µrcdecessors

in in tercst.

('l'r. , pp. 297-299'

Mr. Carter further testified that the plair;tiff ncvc
did contact him nor raise any question with regard to the bour.:I
of the property until sometime in the yci.tr 1972.
p.

301) At that time,

(Tr.,

there had been a survr'y made which

inr1icdt0rl that tll<' ''"!;t bour1rl.1r·y Ji 110 of thr• propPrty i 11
question might extend east of 'l'ic-Fork Creek by apµroximdtelY
33 feet.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by Mr. Carter,
plaintiff)

the plaintiff told Mr. Carter that he (the

had always understood that the east line of the

property was Tie-Fork Creek, and advised Mr. Carter to go
to a place across the street north of the courthouse and
get some quit-claim deeds, and he would straighten out the
description.

(Tr. , pp.

301-3 0 2)

In another conversation between the plaintl.ff and
the defendant, Carter, in about June of 1973, the plaintiff
asked Carter if he (Carter) would like him (Williams) to come
over and spray some weeds in the now disputed area.
pp.

303-304)

(Tr.,

Mr. Carter also testified that he graded,

harrowed, and plill1ted part of the disputed area with grass,
and has cut and maintained it since about 1966, and always
understood the boundaries of the property to be those depicted
by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21".

(Tr., pp. 304-305)

The first intimation that plaintiff claimed title to
the disputed land occurred inunediately prior to the conunencement
by him on September 11, 1974, of his action for alleged
trespass by the defendants, praying for general and punitive
damages and for injunctive relief.

Subsequently, by amended

complaint, the plaintiff added to his complaint a prayer
that the title to the disputed land be quieted in him.
1'he defendants, by way of <mswer to the amended complaint,
denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed land,
etlld furthPr denied that any trespass had been coinmitted
by lh'-' defendants or damage sustained by the plaintiff as a

Lr''-'Ul t

thereof.
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By wo.y of o.ffi1
against the plaintiff,

1tiv•::> defe11ses ctm1 counterclaim

the defenc.lo.nts allegeu that the property'

in question was originctlly conveyed by the plaintiff and
his then wife to the predecessors in interest of the defendants,'
and that the description in said deed ctnd in subsequent
deeds of the same property was erroneous and did not conform
to the description of the land intended to be conveyed by
the parties, and actually occupied and claimed by them.
'l'he defendants also prayed for injunctive relief against
the plaintiffs;

that the title of the defendant, Carter,

to the disputed property be quieted in him on the basis
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and that the
origin~l

deed from the plaintiff be reformed and corrected

to accurately describe the land intended to be conveyed
by the plaintiff anu received by the predecessors in interest
of the defendants;

dlld for general damages,

including damage

for slander of title and punitive damages.
Immediately after the commencement of the tridl,
the defendant, Gerald Carter, was stricken by illness dnd
hospitalized.

'l'he case proceeued without him,

and the evidence

and testimony on behalf of the plaintiff was taken and receivec,
and all evidence on behalf of the defendants was also tdken
and received, except for the testimony of the defendant,
Gerald Carter, which was reserved and the tridl continued
pending his recovery.
On Decembc;r 15, 197(,,

trial wo.s u'conv011ed for

the purpose of recej ·ring the testimony of c1efe11c1dnt,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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Gerald Ccirter.

Following his testimony, upon stipulation

in open court, the action was dismissed against defendant,
Oldroyd.

Defendants Carter and Canto now appeal from the

entry of the adverse judgment and ruling in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COUR'l' TO REFUSE TO REFORM 'l'HE DEED IN
ACCORDANCE WI'l'H 'l'HE IN'l'EN'l'ION OF 'l'HE PAR'l'IES.
In its memorandum decision of January 27, 1977,
the trial court decldred that it did not find "sufficient
facts to order reformdtion of the deed, exhibit 12."

The

court erred in this finding for the following reasons:
First, the deed description itself is erroneous.
If literally followed, it includes a substantial

porti~n

of

U.S. Highway 6 within its bounddries, and extends beyond to the
south side of the highway.
8 5)

(Tr . , pp . 7 , l 0 , 13 , 21, 6 6 , 6 9 ,

'l'he court was perplexed by this and asked Mr. Neeley,

a registered land surveyor, the following question:
Q. (By the court) I can understand, Mr. Neeley,
the two different surveyors taking the 1560 foot
by 300 foot rectangle and not coming out in the
sJmc µlcice.
LluL do you huvc any explc;ttdtion as
to how they both come out in the middle of the
state highway? Do you have an explanation at
all?
(Tr., p. 85, line 10)

Mr. Neeley succinctly replied,
A. Faulty descriptions is all I can say, Judge.
(Tr., p. 85, line 16)
Althouc1h the deed description, "along the state
tcidc1",

is presumed to carry title to the center of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

highway,

(See Hununcl v. You1,y,

(1953);

Annot., 2 A.L.R. 6 (1919), supp., Arn;ot., 49 A.L.R.

2d 982 (1956)),

1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P. 2d 410

the parties clearly did not intend to convey

property on the opposite side of the highway,
held no title.

to which they

By shifting the deed description northward

border along the north edge of the highway,

~

the trial court,

in effect, already has reformed the deed which it said it
would not reform.

Thus, the claim that the deed cannot

be reformed is nonsense, since it must be reformed from the
original description, in order to border along the edge of
the highway.
Second, the trial court also cited the Restatement
of Contracts § 504 (1932), which states:
Except as stated in §§ 506 and 509-511, where both
parties have an identical intention as to the
terms to be embodied in a proposed written conveyance, assignment, contract or discharge, and
a writing executed by them is materially at
variance with that intention, either party
can get a decree that the writing shall be
reformed so that it shall express the intention of the parties, if innocent third
persons will not be unfairly affected thereby.
It is clear from the record that both parties
were mutually mistaken with respect to the faulty deed
description.

After the conveyance from the plaintiff to

himself and his partners doi1:g business as Skyline
Enterprises, on or about May 2 2, 19 5 4, the partnership
operated and occupied a tract of land bounded on the r;orth by
the right-of-way 1j110 of th(' llenvr r <.rncl Hi o Cr,rnde Railroarl;
0

Oil

the east by

d

adjoi1Ji11y Tic-Fork Cu·ek; on the

by U.S. lliyhway 6; anJ on the west by a pond, which is
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the land circumscribed by the yellow line on Exhibit "21".
This fact alone confirms that it was the intention of the
plaintiff to convey that property within the yellow lines
on Exhibit "21" when he executed the warranty deed of
May 22, 1954.
This intention on the part of the granters
and grantees in said deed is bolstered by the further
evidence in the record that when the plaintiff attempted
to interest the defendant, Oldroyd, in coming into the
corporation in the latter part of 1960 or the early part of
1961, he responded to the question of the defendant, Oldroyd,
as to what property was owned by the corporation, by pointing
out the physical boundaries thereof on the ground and describing the tract as bounded on the north by the right-of-way
line of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the east by a
fence adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S. Highway
6; and on the west by a pond, and it was manifestly the

understallding of the defendant, Oldroyd, when he bought into
the corporation, that the corporation owned that property.
(Tr., pp. 238-239)
The evidence further shows that the same representations were made by the plaintiff to Mr. & Mrs. Horlacher,
the predecessors in interest of the defendant, Carter, prior
to the time when they purchased the property from Skyview
Enterprises, Inc., in July of 1963 ('I'r., pp. 207, 215, 261),
,111d

t

lJott1 Oldroyd and the Ilorlachers relied upon those represen-

dtjons in purchasing, respectively, their interests in the
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corporation and the property thereof.
Most importantly,

ill his reply to the counter-

claim of the defendants, under his Third dncl Fourth Defenses,
the plaintiff admitted that the rcpresentations made by
him to Oldroyd and the l!orldchers as to the physical bour.darit'
of the property were true and correct, and were made in
good faith with probable cause for believi nq them to be
true.

Thus,

the rectli ty of these representations,

of the parties thereon,

the reliance

and the in ten ti on of the parties

in contracting with respect to the property cannot be denied.
A mutuctl mistake in the deeded description is clearly shown.
It should be noted,
reformation of the cleed,

further,

that in asking for

the defendants are asking only

that the deed be reformed to confona to the boundary
descriptions of the property ii:tended by the µarties,
are not asking for !'.'._Ore, but,
conveyed by the deed.
more lctnd,

this would not be

2d 248

<l

sufficient busis for denying

See H.oberts v. Hummel,

69 Nev. li;

(1952).

This Court,
Utah 142,

less land than is

However, even if they were asking for

the application to r0form.
243 P.

in fctct,

and

232 P.

i11 Mawhinn''Y v. Jc11sc11,

2J 769

(1951),

instrument can be reformed,

120

has sctid thdt before any

i t is necessary that there be

pre-existing terms on which the minds of the parties have
agreed.
erty be bounded by th<::> na turd l
previou.sly discussc•cl,

and mG1n -mac.le bou 1~'1 dry l i ne.s'

sctid u~~yuir<•1:ic1,L is

luJl·,- scttisli
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1

·<i

''

this cctse.
In McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P. 2d 502
(1952), the Court had before it an application to reform an
instrument and there held that, although unknown to one of
the parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering it
at varictnce with the prior agreement of the parties, and
the other party seeks to take advantage of that mistake,
equity will reform the instrument so as to make it conform
to the agreement of the parties.
It should be borne in mind that the plaintiff in
this case was not only one of the grantors in the original
deed, dated May 22, 1954, but was also one of the grantees
therein and in conjunction with the other grantees occupied
and operated the property up to the physical boundaries circumscribed by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21", rather
than to the precise deeded boundaries depicted by the blue
lines on Exhibit "21".
'l'his Court has also t<1ke11 the position that a
written contract will be reformed to express the agreement
of the parties where proof of the mistake is clear, definite,

<.md

convincing, and where he who seeks relief is not

guilty of inexcusable negligence in executing the instrument and makes timely application for the relief sought.
Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P. 2d 886 (1952);
i~ais~)j 1=_~_\T-~_llodge~,

6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957).

In Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra, this Court held
Lhctt all that is required for there to be "clear and
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convincing evidence" sufficicllt to support reformation of
a deed is that evidence exists whereby this Court can say
that the trial judge acted as a reasonable man in finding
that proof of the facts asserted is greater than a mere
preponderance.

6 Utah 2d at 122, 307 P.

2d at 624.

'l'hat case

was a proceeding to reform a deed, brought by the grantees'
successors in interest, as in this case, against the
grantor.

This Court held that the evidence sustained a

finding that the original parties to the deed intended to
include an additional 130 foot strip in the conveyance, but
that in describing the property in the deed they made a
mutual mistake of fact.
The case of Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332
P. 2d 933 (1958), is quite similar on its facts to the case
at bar.

In that case,

the purchasers sought to reform a

deed to conform to what they alleged was the intention of
the parties.

'l'he record disclosed that the grantors had

employed their uncle as their agent to deal with the

proper~

and had endowed him with authority to act in their behalf;
that the sellers

dllCl

the buyers, c1t the time tlw sale was

ma.de and the documents executed, in tended th ct t

the purchaser

should have a particular trc1ct of land with a frontage of
140 feet and depth of 200 feet undiminished by any easemer.t
or right-of-way; and that the parties were mutually mistaken in believing thal the documents executed crnd delivered
did convey such tr;_H.:t of lanu.

This Court J1cld thc.l th1' rl<'"'1

shoulu be reformed under the circurnstctnces.
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The Court further held that evidence tending to
vary the description in a deed which otherwise contained
no latent ambiguities is admissible to vary that description, notwithstanding the parol evidence rule, when
reformation of the instrument is sought.

See also,

Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 201, 515
P. 2d 614 (1973); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. 2d 354 (Utah, 1975),
These doctrines on the question of reformation of
deeds generally prevail throughout the United States.
~·

See,

Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wash. 2d 877, 194 P. 2d 397

(1948); 'I'horsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wash. 2d 739, 399 P. 2d
510 (1965); Morrissey v. Achziger, 147 Colo. 510, 364 P. 2d
187 (1961); Aja v. Appleton, 86 Nev. 639, 472 P. 2d 524 (1970).
In summary, this basic deed in the chain of title
is subject to reformation on two grounds:

First, because of

the erroneous description, the trial court has already reformed
it by moving the deed description northward so as to be bounded
along the north edge of U.S. Highway 6.

Second, in view of

the representations made by plaintiff to both Oldroyd and the
Horlachers as to the natural and man-made boundaries of the
property, and the subsequent reliance by defendants and their
predecessors in interest on such representations, in using
and occupying the entire property up to said boundaries, the
deed should be reformed to conform to the intention of the
[Jurtics thus manifcstcd, and it was error for the trial court
to refuse to do so.
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POillT II
THE 'l'RIAL COUR'l' ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A BOUNDARY LIHE
ESTABLISHED BY ACQUIESCENCE ALONG 'l'HE NATURAL AND MAN-MADE
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY.
In its memorandum decision in this case, the
trial court also declared that it did not find "sufficient
believable facts to establish a boundary by acquiescense
[sic.] other than that establishing a rectangular area

300 feet by 1560 feet adjacent to the highway."
viously discussed,

As pre-

the erroneous deed description, if

literally const_rued, places the boundary lines of the property so as to include a major portion of U.S. Highway 6,
as well as property on the opposite side of the highway.
In order to find the existence of a boundary line adjacent
to the highway,

the trial court had to reform this deed

description, and somehow find acquiescence in such a
boundary line.

This finding is totally unsupported by the

evidence, and i t was error for the trial court so to rule.
The rule for establishing boundary by acquiescen~
requires that contiguous lctndowners occupy their property
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings and mutually acquiesce in that line as a boundary
for a long period of time.

Under these circumstances, the

Court is required to presume existence of a binding boundary
agreeme1>t, unless the party who attacks the same proves by
competent evidence that there actually was
that there could not have beer..

1;0

aqreement or

A formal or conventionnl
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,,,,,,,,,,I

agreement is not required.

See, Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah

16, 232 P. 2d 202 (19Sl); EkberQ v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239

P. 2d 205 (1951); Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.
2d 391 (1958); Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 353 P. 2d
911 (1960); Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Nielson, 10 Utah
2d 380, 353 P. 2d 918 (1960); Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d
105, 369 P. 2d 117 (1962); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135,
378 P. 2d 893 (1963); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358,
431 P. 2d 788 (1967); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d 133,
477 P. 2c.1 788 (1970); Universal Inv.

Coq~.

v. Kinssbury,

26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P. 2d 173 (1971); Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah
2d 119, 505 P. 2d 1199 (1973); Olsen v. Park Dau9:hters
Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P. 2d 145 (1973); wrisht v.
Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah, 1974); Hobson v. Panguitch
Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792 (Utah, 1975).

See generally;

Note, Boundary by Acquiescence, 3 Utah L. Rev. 504 (1953).
Let us examine each element individually with
respect to the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence.
First, concerning occupation up to a visible line~

It is

clear from the evidence that ever since May 22, 1954 '· when
the plaintiff conveyed the property to himself and others,
as partners doing business under the name and style of
Skyline Enterprises, he and his colleagues as grantees, and
defendants as their successors in interest, have occupied,
cl0imed, and operated the property up to the phy~ical
bounr1aries delineated by the yellow line on Exhibit "21".
1'1,\s

embraces

a

period of more than twenty (20) consecutive
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'l'he part1;crship and lcitcr,

years.

the co1porc.ition,

ccunping facilities and services .for deer hutiters,

provid~rJ

sports11Pn,

and travelers upon the disputcr1 Lmd duriwJ the period when
i t was controlled by Skyline Ei.terprises a1.d :_;kyview E11terpris:
Inc.

( 'l' r . ,

pp .

l O9 ,

29 3)

/\fter January,

ant, Oldroyd, bouql1l i11to the L·ort1oi·ation,
after July 16,

1961, when the defer.:
<111d subseque1;tly,

l9G3, whc11 the l'ropcrty wus pun.:hdsed by the

Ilorlachers and ultirnatcly cor;veycd to the defendant, Carter,

all parties recogni :o::ec1 and acciuicsced in the physical boundaries shown by the yellow lines on Exhibit ";:;l".
'l'he llorlachers and Carter all exercised full
control over the property up to the natural cti:d man-made
boundary lines.

They allowed deer hunters to come

on the disputed area,

tion from plair:tiff,
itself.

ir~

and caYc

the property was grcided without any ob''i
and improvements were ciade on the propeni

Such occupa tio1: ar;d use by de fr'ndan ts has continued

up to the commencerne1:t of this

uctior~.

Second, with respect to
boundary lines:
on Exhibit "21"
~,the

tu al acr1uiescence

i.11

the

'l'hc drca ci rcurnscribed by the yellow lines
follows the ~ctturctl contours of the lctnd,

bOUJld,;ry li11c or 'L'il2-l·'o1k Creek,

right-of-wcty,
llighwdy 6.

Pm

the edge of

the pond,

LIH2

r.d.lroad

ctnd the edye of U.S.

As previously discussed,

plai11ti Cf

on more thJrr

one occc1sio11 rcpres<>11 t<'cl to the llor lctchers, uJ clroyJ, and
1i

More in1p0rtan tly,

l'L..ii 11 t.i f1

'"'!'

0:

tl1<'
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I

pro1H_:r Ly were pr<'c:isrl"!

acJmi L tcd i11 his owr. plC'adi 11

i'.i

i

thdt such reprcsentdtions were true and correct, and were
made i11 good faith with probable cause. for believing them
to !Je true.

Plaintiff is estopped from denying that such

representations were made, and is bound by these admissions
in his pleadings.

Therefore, acquiescence in such boundaries

is clearly shown.
During the testimony of Mr. Horlacher, the court
initially sustained objections to the testimony concetning
plaintiff's oral representations about the boundary lines.
The ostensible ground for sustaining the objection was that
there was no evidence that Horlacher had made the purchase
of the property directly from the plaintiff himself.
reason,

For some

the court felt that where it was not shown that plaintiff

owned the property at the time of the representations, the
representations themselves were not competent.

For example:

THE COURT:***There is no evidence that he made
the purchase from Mr. Williams, Mr. Nelson.
MR. NELSON:
But he made it on the basis of
representation, and that has to do with reference-THE COURT:
Suppose representations were made
by Santa Claus?
ME. NELSON:
It hcts a bearing, your llonor, on
showing the various representations that have
been heretofore made in conflict with what
Mr. Williams now claims to be the boundaries
of the property to show that he made inconsistent
ctnd complete contradictory statements as to where
the boundaries of the property were, and they
impectch Mr. Williams's [sic.] testimony.
COUR'l':
Mr. Williams didn't make the sale
to this man.

'l'l!E

ME. NELSON:
But he made representations to him,
crnd we can show any representations he made to
crn ybody, if it was John Doe, as to where the
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property lines were.
Tl!E COURT:

I hctve ruled.

('l'r., p. 208, lines

6-2 5)

The court subsequently allowed similar

testimony~

come in, but with tongue in cheek, and was obviously still
of the same opinion expressed in its prior ruling, and made
subsequent comments indicatin<J th0t it thouyht little of
the evidence.

For example, upon renewal of the objection,

the court stated:
well taken, but I

"I will tell you your objection may be

am going to let him answer."

(Tr., p.

214, line 23)

There appears to be no legal authority for the
proposition that only a landowner can make representations
with respect to boundary lines of property, nor that such
representations can be made by a landowner only to his immedi·'
ate grantee.

Plaintiff was a former owner of the property who

he made such representations and was the owner of the contig·
uous tract; further, he admitted in his pleadings the
accuracy of the representations made.

tru~~

Although the evidenCT

was admitted, fi11c1Jly, over objection, the court was clearly
influenced by its earlier ruling and persisted in its reasoo~
expressed therein, and it was error to refuse to fairly consl;;i
thi~

clearly competer;t evidence in its judgment.
The gredt preponderance of the evidence, as testific::

to by the Horlachers, Dr. Oldroyd, and Mr. CJrter, clearly

yellow lines on f~xhibit "21",

dlH1

subsequent undisturbed

and undisr11ted occ:up<1tion and control by the llorlachers
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I

_.a,,.,

dnd Carter of the disputed property.

More importantly,

the plaintiff never objected to the exercise of such control.
He only waved to defendant Canto while Canto was grading
the property.

He asked permission of Carter to spray weeds

on the property.

After the sale of the property in 1954,

he removed the old family cabin from the disputed area and
placed it on his retained property on the east side of TieFork Creek.

('I'r., pp. 131, 132, 298)

'I'he preponderance of

credible evidence presented by the defendants in this case
clearly shows mutual acquiescence in the aforementioned
boundary lines.

The finding by the court of a rectangular

bounddry adjacent to the property is w1supported by any substantial evidence, and the court erred in .. so finding.
Third, with respect to a long period of time:
Many of the cases have held thdt occupation of respective
tracts by adjoining landowners for a "long period of time;'
is equated with the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years.
However, the cases do not uniformly hold to a twenty (20)
year miuimum.

Each case is decided on this point on the basis

of the f ~icts.

For cxdlnple, in II obs on v. Panguitch Lake

Corp., supra, the Court held that only under unusual circumstances would a period less than twenty (20) years be
sufficient to create a boundary by acquiescence.

In that

case, because the land was in a remote area and the
c1rqui.0scence endured for only ten ( 10) years, the Court
ilPld that this was not sufficient.

However, in the case

of ~k?_crs~ates, supra, the Court held that boundary
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by acquiescence was established O\'cr a period of eight
(8)

years.
In the ii:sL. u;t case,

the ctcquiesccnce has

CJ.ctually endured since 1954, during pctrt of which period
the plaintiff wore two hats.

He was the grdJ>tor in the

origillal deed and also one of the qrantees,

ar.d, during

that time, both the partnership and the corporation exercised full control over the entire property up to the
boundctry lines included within the yellow lines on
Exhibit "21".

Since 1963, when the defendant, Oldroyd,

became the sole owr.er of Skyview Enterprises,
sold the property to the llor l "c/-,r"rs,

Inc., and

the plcii ri tiff has

been cornµletely out of the picture ctnd the property has
been occupied exclusively by the defendants for f'.lore th<t1•
thirteen

(13)

cor:secutive years,

ctnd, up to the date of

initial proceedin<_:s in this acti . on,

contillued to be so occu-

pied ar.d controlled.
Since the conveyancl' by the plaintiff to the
partnership known as Skylir.e
May 22, 1954,

r·~1;terprises,

on or about

the fence along Tie-Fork Creek hcts operated

as dncl hcts bePn r0cocp1ized by
boundctry line between them.

d}

l

of the parties as the

The rule,

Court in the case of Baum v. nefa,

announced by the

525 P. 2d 725 (Utah,

1974), is to the effect thctt ct fence, although originally
crectted

dS

a barrier i..lnd not as

boundctry by acguicsccr1cc afler

d

boundary,

cdn become a

lh•' pctrccls of ldnd on

either side hdve beer. co11veycd to separcttc pc.rti.C's; and,
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significant to the cn.se now before the Court, the Baum
case also held that this was true, notwithstanding the
fact that the fence ran in a zigzag manner, apparently
not conforming to the deeded description.
The case of Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co.,
supra, is also particularly in point.

In that case, property

was conveyed by a metes and bounds description which in
no way conformed to the meandering line of the Provo River,
and subsequent tax notices and conveyances all appeared to
utilize such deeded description, in spite of the fact
that the parties actually occupied and claimed property
up to a fence running along the meander line of the river.
'l'he Court in that case held that boundary by acquiescence
had been established, notwithstanding the rather obvious
discrepancy between the deeded description and the physical
line of the meandering river.
In the absence of an actual survey, lay grantees
seldom know or are capable of knowing whether or not a
particular metes and bounds description conforms to the
physical boundary lines actually occupied and claimed by
virtue of fences and other structures and monuments.
Especially here, where defendants relied upon plaintiff's
oral representations co1H.:erni11g the boundaries, defendants
hctd

110

reason to doubt the accuracy of the deeded description.
Fourth, with respect to adjoining ownership of the

Lrnd:

'l'wo events are of particular significance on this

point.

First, when defendants' possession survey indicated
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that the boundary of the property might extend some 33 feet
east of Tie-Fork Creek, plaioti ff,
he might lose this (ootage,

undoubtecll'.y worried thc1t

told Mr. Carter thctt he had

d~~

understood that the east line of the property was 'l'ie-Fork

er,,

and advised Mr. Carter to go to a place across the street 00 ~
of the Utah County Courthouse, and get some quit-claim deeds,
and he

(plaintiff) would straighten out the description.

(Tr., pp.

301-302)

Seco11d,

at the time of his conveya11ce to the µart-

nership in 1954, µlaintiff owned a small family cabin locate:
on the disputed property.

Subseque11t to his conveyance to

defendants' predecessors in interest, plaintiff moved thdt
cabin off the disputed property, across Tie-Fork Creek,
plaintiff's own property.

(Tr., pp. 131, 132,

298)

on~

These act

coupled with plaintiff's orul representations, clearly ir;dicctl'
plair.tiff's recognitior. of the 11utural anu ma1;-made bour.dary
lines depicted by thP yellow lin<:s on Exhibit "21".
'l'he burc1cn of proo t' i11 the pldir: ti:L i's action to
quiet title rests on hir1,

and that burden must be met on

the strength of his owr. ti tlc,

ar;d not because of any weak-

ness in that of the deiei:dan ts.
Inv. Co., supra.

Olsen v. Park Daughters

'l'hat burden was not carried in this case.

The court's findiny of a bou1;dary ud_iacent to the highway,
consisting of a rectangular parcel,
by the evidence,

is wholly unsupported

il!ld constitutes reversible ei:-ror.
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POINT III
THE 1'HlAJ, COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY DAMAGES 'l'O
PLAINTIFF.
ln its memorandum decision dated January 27,
1977, the court found as follows:
This court is of the view that the measureof damages to plaintiff's property by reason
of removal of the top soil is the difference
in value before and after the trespass. The
only evidence, uncontradicted in the record, is
that the property was worth $6,000.00 per acre
before the soil disturbance and $3,000.00 per
acre afterwards.
Plaintiff is granted judgment for $3,000.00 per
acre for land distrubed [sic.].
'!'he measure of damages in a case of this type
is the difference in value immediately before and
immediately after the damage has been committed.

~·

Cleary v. Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 P. 453 (1916) ;
Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P. 2d 3 (1967);
Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P. 2d 648 (1972).
However, in assessing damages against the
defendants, the trial court failed to take into account two vital
points which nullify the award of damages made in this
Ci.J.Se.

First, the court states that the only evidence,
"uncontradicted in the record," was that the property was
worth $6,000.00 per acre before the alleged trespass, and
$1,000.00 per acre afterwards.

This finding was based

sol<'ly upon the flat, unsupported assertions of the
pLii11tiff,

as recorded in the transcript:
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Do you huve cin opi11io1,, Mr. Clctrk [sic.] , i.iS to
the value of tlw disputed J>roµcrty prior to the
grading?

Q.

A.

Tt would be ctround $6,000.00

dcre.

ctn

Do you hcive aL opinioi; as to its vctlue
after the grading?

Q.

A.

It would cut the value ir: half.

(Tr.,

p.

202)

This self-serving testimony by plain ti ff was total!;
u1~supported

by any cvide11ce of property Vctlues or surrounrli11i

circumstances.

It was merely a statement of his opinion as

to how much the proµerty was worth.

Such bald assertions

hctve not been admitted by the courts as competent evidence
concerning the Vctlue of dctmaged property.
State Road Comm'n v. Johnsor:,
Burke v. Thomas,

313 P.

550 P.

2d 1082

2d 216

(Okla.,

(Utah,

1976);

1957).

The cruciul point of plaintiff's testimony,
however,

is not so nmch thctt plaintiff himself testifietl

as to its value,

b11t

tl«1t he' did so upon

erroneous ctssumptio1•.

d

patently

Plctintiff testified thctt he desired
as well as

to build summer homes upon the disputed areu,
upon his own property,
104-10'))

'l'hc subsL''i11c11t testimoi~y by plctii.tiff's realtor

witness, Mr.
property

(Tr., PP·

across Tic-Fork Creek.

<lS

Bctads<Jctctrd, wcts also based upon Vctluation of the
a poteLtial site for sumner homPs.

'l'he property, however,

is curre1:tly zoned by

Utdh Couuty for sct'liccs_ cir;cl !:rc1de,.
restaurant,

<lnd

The cxistinq motel,

sec1i cc• stciti 011 u1,011 the propr,rty all

comply with such :?011i "'l res tricti 01;.

:~ur.Ln:c1

ctre not permittcJ rn1der curr01.t ;:oni1>CJ ldW.

lLomes

'l'h,,rc fore,
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plaintiff's testimony as to the value of the property for
sununer home lots, as well as Daadsgaard's testimony as to
the "hi•-1hest u!id best use" of the property being for
recreational home
bility.

sites, is based upon a legal impossi-

Sir.ce the property cannot be so used, and is only

available for trade ctnd services use, the valuation of the
property must be adjusted consistent therewith.
on the

The work done

land by defendants Carter and Canto clearly improved

the same for the use for which it was zoned and employed.
Baadsgaard admitted (Tr., p. 188) that the property was zoned for services and trade.

He also admitted that

the use of the property as a trailer park and camping area,
which is the precise use made by the defendants, would be an
appropriate and proper use of the property under the present
circumstances.

('l'r., pp. 188-189, 192-193)

Second, the court based the award of damages
upon the value of the property immediately before and
inunediately after the alleged

trespass.

In so doing, the

court failed to take into account the radical improvements
Whi c;h dcf!'ndctlltS,

u,;d

their prcclcccssors in interest, had

upoll the property prior to the allec3ec.l trespass of

lllddc

which the plaintiff complains.

Mr. Horlacher testified that,

when lw purchased the property in 1964, there was a
"bic1 fir>ld of wild thorn bushes," which he was obliged
to 'Jl"dde dJ<d clear off the property.
1

10, ! ll·J,c1

l :it

i

r:

('l'r., p. 217)

The

s then, ofter grading the property, proceeded to

a lrc1iler court and restrooms to acconunodate
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visi tiug cctmpers d11d deer hu1: Le rs.
Thus,

('l'r.

t

PP•

217-218)

i t is clectr thctt durii;·1 the llorlctchcrs'

of tne µroperty,

its concJi U.oL c1ucl dppe01

stantictlly improved.

('l'r.

P•

t

nl)

If,

occupation

d1,cc~

wus sub-

therefore,

there

was ;,my trespciss ctt ull, which thL" defend<..u.ts do not co1;cede,

i t first occurred when Mr

llorL.. cher cJe,ired the thori.

bushes ar:d improved the property in or about 19 6 4.
Defer;da11t Ca11to,
also testified that,

an edrth mover ctlld land leveler,

i11 his professiondJ

opinion,

there

WJs

very little diffcrci:cc in thf' coi:dition of the property befon
and after the grudintJ work which he perfornetl.

('l'r •

P• 277)

t

It thPrc'lnrc c1ppcc11s U1"l pl<tiLtiff desires to
take ,,clvct11ta<Je of

substdLliiJl improvcric1.ts nictcle upo1:

tlir•

the property by def c11dct1~ ts cti.d their predecessors in interest,
in measuring the alleged ddIT.ctqes be fore a11d after the
supposed trespctss.
exist,

Un

the coi; tJ ary,

if dllY dctJnctges ctt ctll

they should be assessed with respect to the origindl~

"trespdss", when th"" \lorlachers first qradPcl «11d removed
the thon1 patchcs upoll the prop1c1ty.

Pl.d.1;tiff should

not be ctllowed to profit unjustly by the work performed by
l'n~tlc•~L::;;;oLs

defcl!d,,1.U;'

u11d1;1

.11. ,,J]e'J'-'cl tr<'SJ>dSS,

,wcl

thc 11

seek redress for allccieclly undoj 1:11 pcirt of the improvements s:
made by subsequeLl <,Jradi11c;.

The bcfore-d1:cl-"fter test, if

applied at dll, sho11ld n'lctt1' to the crn;dition of the lclf:J
before .; ll cl

d

f tr• r

ti 1,-,

i 1ij_ li

ct J

"J ] ( ' I c cl tr 1· ci p ,, s ~~ ,

.i

11 11

11 o

t

L0

sorne other selc,-t,ccJ 'I"' U:.
Ls

dWctrd of

11101:cy dam<1'1'-'"
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plaintiff, failed to consider the aforementioned factors,
such award constituted reversible error.
if any dantaqcs wen• incurred,

In the alternative,

they should be etssessetl so as

not to reward plaintiff for the substantial improvements
performed by defendants upon the land, but rather on the basis
of the condition of the property in its original state, complete
with the thorns, as compared to its condition after the 1974
grading.
CONCLUSION
1'he great preponderance of evidence in this case
clearly demonstrates the occupation, use, and control by
defendants and their predecessors in interest, and $cquiescence
therein by plaintiff, of the entire property bordered by the
natural and man-made boundary lines:

e.g., the Dehver and

Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way on the north, an e)(isting
fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork Creek on the east, U.S.
Highway 6 on the south, and the west boundary of a pond on the
west.
There is no credible evidence to sustain the finding
by the trial court of a rectan<Jular parcel bordering on the
highway.

The origi11al deed description itself is erroneous,

placinq the property so as to embrace a major portion of
U.S. Ilighwcty 6.
L.111quLt1

pdrcel, dcl ju~;tcd northward to corr0ct the faulty

dc'.'-ic;J j1,tinn,
1

.,j11

There is simply no basis for finding a rec-

n. ldrqe portion of which then crosses over the

n,,d tr<1cks ctnd right-of-way.

Such finding, itself

c:ollcolituting a reformation of the deed, bears no resembiance
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to the property dctuolly intci;wed to br• conveyed,
sequer: tly occupied dnd use cl for over twenty

( 2 0)

dEcl subye ii rs by

defei:dan ts dnd their µredecessors in interest.
There is no credible evidence to suµport the
fir~ding

and

con•~lusion

trespass by the

of tlFo trial court with respect to

defei;dd1~ts

resultin9 therefrom,

or ciEY damage to the plaintiff

ci!id the court erred ill its inter-

pretation of the ;,pplicdble rul_es of evideLce.

The court

erred further in its rulin<J or. oclmissibil.ity and in its
otti tude with respect to the cri ticul testir1ony of the
ilorlo.chers ctr:J llr. <Jldroyd,

rcloti1;9

to re1.iresentations

mode by the pldi11tift- coJ.ceri:iri•J the ide11t.ificdtion of the
lond owned, operi.lted,

iind controlled by Skyview Enterprises,

Inc.
Appell an ts respectfully submit thdt these fir;dings
by the tridl court constitute clear error,
th0 j ud<_Jmen t

ctr: cl

;,r;d request thdt

0wo.rd of d<tma<JCS to plaintiff be reversed.

subsequent convey.11,ces in the ch,;in of title be reformcJ to

titl<::> to the property olon<] the aforeme1;tioned boundary line'
be quieted iii ctppelL;nt Gerctlcl Carte1·
bound<1ry by

011

tl-..cc hasis of

acquicsc<!1.c1~.

V. PEkSiilNG NEf,'.~ON
J\LI)!{ ICll & UEL[ocl;J
J 3 Ects t 200 1101-th
Provo, Utoh
84601
Attorneys for Appellants
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